

# Top 7 things healthcare institutions must do to remain both HIPAA compliant *and* truly secure

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## Who is Shahid?

## Cybergeek at Netspective, Gov't Tech & Security Advisor

- 15 years of risk management and cybersecurity expertise (in healthcare, government, and other sectors)
- 15 years of technology management experience (government, non-profit, commercial)
- 18 years of healthcare IT and medical devices experience (blog at <u>http://healthcareguy.com</u>)
- 25 years of software engineering and multidiscipline complex IT implementations (Gov., defense, health, finance, insurance)



Author of two chapters: "Understanding Medical Practice Cybersecurity Risks" and "How to Conduct a Health-Care Environment Electronic Risk Assessment"

## What's this talk about?

#### Background

HIPAA, while a regulatory necessity, is an insufficient framework for modern healthcare risk management cybersecurity.

Most HIPAA compliant institutions have tons of insecure systems because they confuse compliance with security.

#### Key takeaways

- Every technology in a modern healthcare enterprise network is becoming more and more healthcareneutral.
- There's nothing unique about digital health data that justifies complex, expensive, or special cybersecurity technology.
- Healthcare-specific cybersecurity and risk frameworks are going to do more harm than good and the industry should look to major federal government initiatives like DHS CDM for guidance on approach and tools.

## The Soapbox



You can be compliant and not secure, secure but not compliant, or both



😥 Compliant insecurity is pretty common

#### Compliance: often binary (yes/no)



Security: always continuous

## An example of compliant insecurity

#### **Compliance Requirement**

- Encrypt all data at FIPS 140 level



#### Insecure but compliant

- Full disk encryption
  - Encryption keys stored on same disk
- SSL encryption
  - No TLS negotiation or man in the middle monitoring

#### Secure and compliant

- Full disk encryption
  - Disk-independent key management
- TLS encryption
  - Force SSL → TLS and monitor for MIM threats

## Another example of compliant insecurity

#### **Compliance Requirement**



• Establish procedures for creating, changing, and safeguarding passwords



#### Insecure but compliant

- Default admin password
- Documentation says password should be changed upon initial setup
- Documentation says password should be rotated frequently

#### Secure and compliant

- When device or software is initially setup, it forces a password change
- Device or software prompts to change password regularly
- Device or software reports, each night, if default passwords aren't changed or rotations haven't occurred

## Why does compliant insecurity occur?

#### Compliance is focused on...

• Regulations

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- Meetings & discussions
- Documentation
- Artifact completion checklists



#### Instead of ...

- Risk management
  - Probability of attacks
  - Impact of successful attacks
- Threat models
  - Attack surfaces
  - Attack vectors
- Bottom-up asset management
  - Full inventory assessment
  - Continuous change management
  - Asset- and risk-specific threat mitigation
- Regular pen testing, user behavior analytics, and data loss prevention activities

## Forget compliance...at first



Get your security operations in proper order before concentrating on compliance.

Start sounding like a broken record, ask "is this about security or compliance?" often.



## Make sure the right people are in charge

#### Law: Compliance

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#### **Order: Security**

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Make sure the right people are in charge



Understand what's what



# Increased payer / provider collaboration and increases threat surfaces and will drive further data leakage



#### Huge breaches occur already, what's to come?



Economic Stability	Neighborhood and Physical Environment	Education	Food	Community and Social Context	Health Care System						
Employment Income Expenses Debt Medical bills Support	Housing Transportation Safety Parks Playgrounds Walkability	Literacy Language Early childhood education Vocational training Higher education	Hunger Access to healthy options	Social integration Support systems Community engagement Discrimination	Health coverage Provider availability Provider linguistic and cultural competency Quality of care						
Health Outcomes Mortality, Morbidity, Life Expectancy, Health Care Expenditures, Health Status, Eunctional Limitations											

### Audience Participation

# Are your senior executives well versed in the major concepts like compliance vs. security vs. privacy?

- Yes, this is all elementary and our team understands it completely
- No, we understand most of the concepts but some of the nuances aren't clear
- No, we do not understand all the concepts and could use guidance



# There is no cybersecurity crisis *specific* to healthcare.

To get the best tools and frameworks with the best support, stay industry-neutral. Whenever something becomes "healthcare specific" it slows down its innovation.

# Risk management, continuous diagnostics & mitigations are a concern.



# There is a healthcare data privacy crisis.

Not enough organizations have separated *digital* confidentiality and privacy policies from security policies.

User behavior analytics (UBA) and data loss prevention (DLP) technology isn't as widely deployed as it should be.



## Preparing annual controls catalogs and compliance documentation or passing audits doesn't mean you're safe.

Not enough organizations differentiate between point in time assessments versus continuous monitoring.

Only continuous monitoring of each operational asset, from the bottom-up, ensures security.



Things healthcare institutions must do to remain both HIPAA compliant and truly secure

#### The Top 7 tips for 2017





#### #1 When you have a choice, follow Department of Homeland Security (DHS) guidance; we must *go beyond HIPAA* and healthcare-specific frameworks.

Hackers don't use "healthcare" tools to steal medical records so you shouldn't follow different rules to keep them out.

Learn about the \$6 billion DHS Continuous Diagnostic & Mitigation (CDM) Program.





... DHS collaborates with sectors through Sector Coordinating Councils (SCC)

#### **Business / Personal**

- Shopping & Banking Point of Sale (in store or on line)
- Personnel
- Social Media

≻ ...



The DHS led CDM Program covers 15 continuous diagnostic capabilities. Your data is not secure unless you understand the entire lifecycle.

#### **Phase 1: Endpoint Integrity**

- HWAM Hardware Asset Management
- SWAM Software Asset Management
- CSM Configuration Settings Management
- VUL Vulnerability Management

#### Phase 2: Least Privilege and Infrastructure Integrity

- TRUST –Access Control Management (Trust in People Granted Access)
- BEHAVE Security-Related Behavior Management
- CRED Credentials and Authentication Management
- PRIV Privileges

#### Phase 3: Boundary Protection and Event Management for Managing the Security Lifecycle

- Plan for Events
- Respond to Events
- Generic Audit/Monitoring
- Document Requirements, Policy, etc.
- Quality Management
- Risk Management
- Boundary Protection Network, Physical, Virtual



### Audience Participation

## Is there a reason for healthcare-specific security solutions or should we use industry-neutral tools and technologies?

- No, there's no good reason not to be industry-neutral because our problems in healthcare are the same as everyone else's (medical devices are no different than other IoT devices)
- No, but there are some healthcare-specific problems that we should tell DHS and standards bodies about (like medical devices)
- Yes, there are many good reasons to work on healthcare-specific security solutions because industry-neutral tools are not good enough

## #2 Consider costs while planning security

100% security is impossible so compliance driven environments must be slowed by cost drivers



Source: Olovsson 1992, "A structured approach to computer security"

## #3 Don't rely primarily on perimeter defense

Firewalls and encryption aren't enough

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Many breaches occur by insiders, lots of data disseminated accidentally

Rely on risk-based roleaware user behavior analytics and anomaly detection



## #4 Understand architecture transition impacts



#### #5 Create risk and threat models...and share them widely

He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared – Sun Tzu

#### **Define threats**

- Capability, for example:
  - Access to the system (how much privilege escalation must occur prior to actualization?)
  - Able to reverse engineer binaries
  - Able to sniff the network
- Skill Level, for example:
  - Experienced hacker
  - Script kiddie
  - Insiders
- Resources and Tools, for example:
  - Simple manual execution
  - Distributed bot army
  - Well-funded organization
  - Access to private information
- Motivation + Skills and Capabilities tells you what you're up against and begins to set tone for defenses

#### Create minimal documentation that you will keep up to date

Threat	Layer where mitigation is implemented	Nature of mitigation provided (if specific to Windows Azure)	Application/Se mitigation req	ervice-layer uired	Is this issue higher risk or more complex in cloud deploymen ts?				
Spoofing									
Side-channel attacks against VM Guests on the same physical host	Platform	1 VM per core, no communications between different tenants	None Required	one Required					
Disclosure of data in transit between client and server	Mitigation is transpare	ent to the customer, no action	required.	ce of HTTP Jata is	Yes				
Disclosure of SSL Certificates/keys used by Web Roles	Mitigation is provided and must be utilized t Requires calls to exist Mitigation is per-servi	Mitigation is provided by underlying platform/infrastructure and must be utilized by the customer's web application/service; Requires calls to existing/provided APIs. Mitioation is per-service and is not provided at a lower level;							
Disclosure of arbitrary secrets in blob/table/queue storage	Must be mitigated by Mitigation is not yet in Windows Azure) but w Mitigation is not yet in Windows Azure) and APIs once complete.	t data prior not store า Windows	Yes						

Source: OWASP.org, Microsoft

## #6 Visualize attacks / vulnerabilities



## Create an Attack Library...and share it!

- Password Brute Force
- Buffer Overflow
- Canonicalization
- Cross-Site Scripting
- Cryptanalysis Attack
- Denial of Service
- Forceful Browsing
- Format-String Attacks
- HTTP Replay Attacks
- Integer Overflows

- LDAP Injection
- Man-in-the-Middle
- Network Eavesdropping
- One-Click/Session Riding/CSRF
- Repudiation Attack
- Response Splitting
- Server-Side Code Injection
- Session Hijacking
- SQL Injection
- XML Injection

### Collect attack causes and mitigations...& share!

- Define the relationship between
- The exploit
- The cause
- The fix

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Source: Microsoft

## Audience Participation

## Are your security threats properly modeled, prioritized, and shared?

- We have a well understood threat assessment process and we have properly documented threat models tied to our risk assessments at the asset level (bottom up)
- We have a well understood threat assessment process and we have properly documented threat models tied to our risk assessments at the security boundaries but not at the asset level (top down)
- We the understand threat assessment process but we have not documented threat models tied to our risk assessments
- No, we haven't done proper threat assessments tied to risks

### #7 No security theater! Make risk-based decisions

#### How you know you're "secure"

- Value of assets to be protected is understood
- Known threats, their occurrence, and how they will impact the business are cataloged
- Kinds of attacks and vulnerabilities have been identified along with estimated costs
- Countermeasures associated with attacks and vulnerabilities, along with the cost of mitigation, are understood
- Real risk-based decisions drive decisions **not security theater**

## Bonus! #8 Review security body of knowledge

#### Everyone

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- FIPS Publication 199 (Security Categorization)
- FIPS Publication 200 (Minimum Security Requirements)
- NIST Special Publication 800-60 (Security Category Mapping)

#### Executives and security ops

- NIST Special Publication 800-18 (Security Planning)
- NIST Special Publication 800-30 (Risk Management)

#### Security ops and developers

- NIST Special Publication 800-53 (Recommended Security Controls)
- Microsoft Patterns & Practices, Security Engineering
- OWASP
- IEEE Building Code for Medical Devices

#### Auditors

- NIST Special Publication 800-53 (Recommended Security Controls)
- NIST Special Publication 800-53A Rev 1 (Security Control Assessment)
- NIST Special Publication 800-37 (Certification & Accreditation)

## Key Takeaways

- If you have good security operations in place then meeting compliance requirements is easier and more straightforward.
- Even if you have a great compliance track record, it doesn't mean that you have real security.



## DHS CDM Deep Dive



## The CDM Program BPA Tools Catalog

Continuous Diagnostics & M	uct Catalog As	of: 9/11/201	5			®					
Homeland Security					G	S۵					
	CDM PHASE 1 CDM PHASE 2										
The purpose of the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation ( CMaaS customers with a comprehensive list of CDM securit CDM CMaaS Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA). This guide	CDM Product Manufacturer	CDM Product Family	HWAM	SWAM	CSM	VUL	TRUST	BEHAVE	CRED	PRIV	Munufacturer's Product Description
The Tools/CMaaS BPA Product Catalog lists the tools and se create the Tools/CMaaS Product Catalog includes the CMaa	Avecto	DefendPoint Privilege Management								x	Defendpoint provides all the tools you need to suc the right amount of access, with permissions applie themselves. Standard users are highly secure, yet s compromised. By enabling all employees to work e environment.
Over the course of the CDM program, technology-based sol increasingly robust solutions. As new CDM Program capabil accordingly.	Axiomatics	Axiomatics Data Access Filter					x	x	x	x	The Axiomatics Data Access Filter (ADAF) is an auti purpose of applying policy-based controls in datab according to policy, by modifying SQL statements s enables dynamic filtering of database content, cen integrate with multiple database products.
The Tools/CMaaS Product Catalog is not intended as an aut support alignment and acquisition of specific products, sup development and refinement. All product categorizations, (	Axiomatics	Axiomatics Policy Server					x	x	x	x	The Axiomatics Policy Server (APS) is a solution ava (ABAC). With three different types of authorization requirements.
	Axiomatics	Axiomatics Reverse Query					x	x	x	x	The Axiomatics Reverse Query (ARQ) is an authoriz Where the Axiomatics Policy Server responds to in Axiomatics Reverse Query helps automate process
	BDNA	BDNA Discover	x	x							BDNA Discover delivers insights into the IT environ and software assets including those not covered b provides advanced application discovery for top v provides complete visibility into the IT environmer GRC.
	BDNA	BDNA Normalize	x	x							BDNA Normalize is a solution that uses Technoped information about enterprise hardware and softwi sources to create a single version of accurate and t clean, accurate, and relevant data to drive effectiv
	BDNA	BDNA Technonedia	x	x							BDNA Technopedia categorizes and aligns hardwar relevant information. With more than 1.2 million p

## DHS Open Source Cybersecurity Catalog

CATEGORY	APPLICATION(S)
Administration	CFengine, Expect, Process Hacker, Webmin
Anti-spyware	Nixory
Antivirus	ClamAV, ClamWin, Moon Secure Antivirus, Simple Machine Protect
Application Languages & Development Environments	BASH, Clang, Coccinelle, Cygwin, DDD, Eclipse, Emacs, GCC, GDB, Gedit, Java, phpHtmlLib, Python, Qlue, Ruby, Vi, VIM
Browser Add On	Password Maker, Web of Trust
Business Continuity	AMANDA, Areca Backup, Partimage
Cloud Computing	ABIQUO, Cloudstack, Eucalvotus, Juiu, Nimbula, Open Nebula, OpenStack
Configuration Management	CFengine, Puppet, Salt
Content Management	Chef, Drupal, Joomla, Juju, Wordpress
Data Backup & Archival	Bacula, Open Nebula, PeaZip, Unison
Database	MariaDB, MvSQL, NetDB, Percona, PostureSQL, SQLite
Data Removal	BleachBit, Darik's Boot and Nuke, Eraser, Wipe
Directory	OpenLDAP
Disk	BleachBit, DBAN, Gparted, Midnight Commander, Parted, Partimage
Email	amavisd-new, ASSP, JAMES Mail, Mozilla Thunderbird, Postfix, Spam Assassin, SquirrelMail, VPOP Email, Zarafa, Zimbra
Email Protection & Anti- Spam	amavisd new, ASSP, Postgrey, Spam Assassin
Email Services	JAMES Mail, Postfix, SquirrelMail, Zimbra
Encryption	AxCrypt, Crypt, Cryptacular, GNU Privacy Guard, John the Ripper, Mac GNU Privacy Guard, NeoCrypt, Network Security Services (NSS), OpenSSL, TrueCrypt
Enterprise Applications	Open Atrium, Open Source Corporate Management Information Systems (OSCMIS), WorldVistA
File Transfer	CyberDuck, FileZilla, Fugu, Samba, ysftpd, WinSCP
Filtering	DansGuardian, IP Tables, Java EE PDF uXSS Filter, Web Scarab
Firewall	Devil Linux, Endian Firewall Community, ferm, Firestarter, Firewall Builder, IP Coo, monowall, ModScounty, NetCoo UTM, Open WAF, ptSense, Sentry Firewall, Shorewall, Smoothwall, Turthe Firewall, Untanale, Yuumuur, Watta, Zentyal
Forensics	BackTrack, LibHTP, Maltego, Mobius Forensics Toolkit, mod. ssihaf, ODESSA, Icpdump, Icpindex, The Sleuth Kit/Autopsy Browser, WinDump, WinPcap, Wireshark
Geographic Information Systems (GIS)	Falcon View, Open Streetmap, Opticks, PGGIS
Host Based IPS (HIPS)	AFICK (Another File Integrity Checker), Open Source Tripwire, OSSEC
ID Authentication Methods	WIKID
Information Technology Infrastructure	Dradis, OpenCPI
Intrusion Detection & Monitoring	ackack, Kismet, Munin, Open Source Tripwire, OpenVAS, Process Hacker, Suricata, Thicknet, Zabbix

CATEGORY	APPLICATION(S)
Intrusion Detection & Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS)	Fail2Ban, IronBee, OSSEC, QuIDScor, Snort, Suricata
Monitoring Systems	Cacti, ICINGA, Nagios, NetDB, OpenNMS, PandoraFMS, Zabbix, Zenoss
Network	ackack, AFTR, BIND, BIND 10, Bird, BSD Router, ISC DHCP, Munin, Netcat, NetDB, Nmap, Quaqua, Samba, Souid
Network Communications Protection	OpenSSH, OpenSSL, Squid
Operating System (OS)	Android, Arch Linuz, BackTrack, CentOS, ClearOS, Ovowin, Debian Linux, Devil Linux, Endian Friewall Community, Fedora, FreeBSD, Genico, IP Cop, Knopolz, Kubunlu, Linhweihh Portable Security (100) Linux Distroj, mich/wall, Mandrinu Linux, NetBSD, NetCop UTM, OpenBSD, openSUSE, Openwall GNULinux (OWL), Bod Hat Enterprise Linux, Samuri WFT, Sentry Friewall, Slackware, Smoothwall, SUSE Enterprise, Ubaniu, Unitanole, Zontval
OS Hardening	AppArmor, Bastille Unix, Gentoo Hardened Profile, SE Linux
Password Management	KeePass Password Safe, KeePassX, Passkool, Password Maker, Password Safe
Penetration Testing & Vulnerability Assessment	Airoscript-NG, Angry IP Scanner, Auto Scan, BackTrack, batchyDNS, Cacti, Deblaze, Deface, Graudit, InSSIDer, Joos Autopwn Scnpt, JBro-Luzz, JSP Tester, NisMAC, Kismel, Lunis, Melasolid, Nimag, Ophrack, Peach Fuzzing Platform, QuDScor, SQL Map, Icondex, Vega, W3AE, Wireshark
Problem Management	BugZilla, Request Tracker
Program Analysis	AntiSamy, Acparat Avalanche, BLAST: Berkeley Lazy Abstraction Software Verification Tool, Bind Elephani, Checkstyle, ClarmWin, Casc/heck, COUAL, CSRF Guard, Dmalloc, Dwinst, Findhusz, Flawfinder, Frame-C, Gendame, JavaSnoo, Jchorl, JSP Tester, LähtTP, Moon Secure Antivinus, Moose, Orizon, Pay, PMD Copy/Pasta Detector, ROSE, RIL-Check, Scrubbr, Simple Machine Protect, Smatch, Sonar, Soot, Sparse, Splint, Squale, Sumse, StyleCop, Valarind, Yasca
Remote Access Methods Clients	NoMachine, OpenSSH, OpenSSL, PuTTY, PuTTY CAC, TightVNC
Revision Control	CVS, Fossil, git, Mercurial, Subversion
Security Planning Tools	Metasploit, spt (Simple Phishing Toolkit), WebGoat
Storage Tools	DRDB, OCES 2, Openfiler, Orange FS, Sheepdog, Swift
Virtualization	Cygwin, KeepAlived, KVM, OpenStack Compute, OVM, Packetyzer, VirtualBox, Xen
Visualization	ParaView
VPN	Cacti, OpenVPN
Vulnerability Patch Management	Lvnis, Nikto2, OpenVAS, Roque Scanner
Web Accessibility	Chromium, Konqueror, Mozilla Firefox
Web Server Software	Anache, Anache Tomcat, Drupal, Enterprise Security API, Iboss Autopym Script, JBoss Enterprise Application Platform, Lucene, mod. ssihaf, NGINX, Nikto2, Open Atrium, Plane, Web/SD, Zimbra, Zope
Web Services	AW Stats, Classic ASP Security Image Generator (CAPTCHA), Django, Joomla, MediaWiki, PIWIK, Plone

## SecTools.org and DHS Research Program

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#### **Open Cyber Tools & Data**

#### **Open Tools & Data**

The DHS Science and Technology Directorate has an active cybersecurity research program. It has produced a lot of useful open source cyber security tools and data sets. Please give them a try, let us know what you think.

View on GitHub 🔘

#### **Open Tools**

#### Software Assurance

 Code Pulse: Code Pulse is a visualization-centric tool that provides insight into the real-time code coverage of black box testing activities. It is a desktop application that runs on most major platforms.

 Software Assurance Marketplace - To identity vulnerabilities early and often in your development cycle, use SWAMP for continuous software assurance. Our platform can be used by anyone who is interesting in creating better, more secure software ecosystem

#### Network Tools

Suricata - Suricata is a high performance Network IDS, IPS and Network Security Monitoring
engine. Open Source and owned by a community run non-profit foundation, the Open
Information Security Foundation (OISF).

CAIDA Tools - Network measurement and visualization tools from the Cooperative
Association for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA).

 ANT Software - The ANT project provides software for Packet Trace Analysis and Anonymization, IPv4 Census and Survey Analysis and Visualization, and DNS Analysis and Privacy.

 STUCCO - Situation and Threat Understanding by Correlating Contextual Observations (STUCCO) Lets you search and process large amounts of data and documents. Global threat views can help security analysts allocate their resources and adjust policies proactively.

**RPKI** Tools

## Security Lifecycle challenges and advice

- How do you design and build in security when the software, hardware, and medical devices come from third parties?
- What risk management and investment prioritization frameworks should you use?
- Are you using a bottom-up risk assessment or top-down risk cataloging process?



## Cybersecurity Framework



- Developed in collaboration with industry, provides guidance to an organization on managing cybersecurity risk
- Supports the improvement of cybersecurity for the Nation's Critical Infrastructure using industry-known standards and best practices
- Provides a common language and mechanism for organizations to
  - describe current cybersecurity posture;
  - describe their target state for cybersecurity;
  - identify and prioritize opportunities for improvement within the context of risk management;
  - assess progress toward the target state;
  - Foster communications among internal and external stakeholders.
- Composed of three parts: the Framework Core, the Framework Implementation Tiers, and Framework Profiles

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## NIST Cybersecurity Framework

Function	Category		Fram	ework Core	
	Asset Management	Functions	Categories	Subcategories	Informative References
	Business Environment				
IDENTIFY	Governance	IDENTICY			
	Risk Assessment	IDENTIFY			
	Risk Management				
	Access Control	Rev.			
	Awareness and Training	PROTECT			
PROTECT	Data Security	FROTECT			
PROTECT	Information Protection Processes and			- F	
	Procedures				
	Protective Technology	DETECT			
	Anomalies and Events				
DETECT	Security Continuous Monitoring				
	Detection Processes	and the second se		TARGET	CURRENT
	Communication	RESPOND		Identify	
RESPOND	Analysis	A DESCRIPTION OF TAXABLE PARTY.		Protect	
	Mitigation			Detect	
	Improvements		F	Respond	
	Recovery Planning	RECOVER		Recover	
RECOVER	Improvements				
	Communication			Tier 0 1 2 3	0 1 2 3 0
				0 7 1 0	0 1 7 0
Ident	ify Risk Assess Risk Use R Sel	isk Management Proce lect Categories and Tie	ess to ers	Implement Selecte	d Subcategories

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## Asset management challenges and advice

- Where is your hardware and software inventory stored?
- How are you tracking configuration settings?
- Who's curating your vulnerabilities?
- How are your boundaries documented?



ENISA Threat Landscape



		Current		Тор	10 Threat T	rends in En	nerging Are	eas	
Top Th	reats	Trends	Cyber- Physical Systems and CIP	Mobile Computing	Cloud Compu- ting	Trust Infrastr.	Big Data	Internet of Things	Netw. Virtuali- sation
1. Maliciou Worms/	s code: 'Trojans	0	0	0	0	0		0	0
2. Web-bas attacks	ed	0	0	0	0	٢		0	
3. Web app attacks /Injectic attacks	lication on	0	0	θ	0	0		0	0
4. Botnets		0		0	0				
5. Denial of	fservice	0	0		٢	٢		0	0
6. Spam		0	0						
7. Phishing		0		0		0	0	0	0
8. Exploit k	its	0		0		0		0	
9. Data bre	aches	0			0		0		0
10. Physica damage /loss	l /theft	0	0	0		0	0	0	0
11. Insider	threat	٢	0		0		0	0	0
12. Informa leakage	ation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
13. Identity theft/fra	/ aud	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
14. Cyber espiona	ge	0	0		0	0	0		0
15. Ranson Roguew Scarewa	nware/ are/ ire	0		θ					

Legend: Trends: U Declining, C Stable, O Increasing





#### ENISA Threat Landscape 2014

Overview of current and emerging cyber-threats
December 2014

enisa

European Union Agency for Network and Information Security www.enisa.europa.eu



## Accounts management challenges & advice



- Do you have identity, credentialing, and access management (ICAM) or just IAM?
- Do you have user behavior analytics (UBA) capabilities?
- Is your training tied to specific risks and assets from a bottomup perspective?

## Event management challenges & advice



- How sophisticated is your security information and event management (SIEM) infrastructure?
- Do you run breach and incident simulations to help prepare for contingencies?
- Do you have a data spill or other incident response plan documented and ready to execute?

## ISAOs as a Model for Regional Cooperation



#### http://www.dhs.gov/isao

## ISAO Value Proposition

#### Value to industry

- Possibility for clearances for collaboration
- Government-sourced data and analytics

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- Data can be used to protect enterprise and customers
- Build trusted relationships with other sectors and government partners

#### **Mutual Value**

- Actionable indicators of cyber threat activity from public and private sectors give better understanding of threat
- Analytic Collaboration Events

#### Value to government

- Cyber threat indicators from critical infrastructure
- Industry SME access to NCCIC
- Building of trust relationships across critical infrastructure sectors
- Raise bar for network defense

#### One entity's detection becomes another's prevention

https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/c3vp/CISCP\_20140523.pdf

## ISAOs and Coordinating Processes

A CSIRT Process Model for Improving Information Sharing & Knowledge Capture in Cybersecurity https://www.itu.int/dms\_pub/itu-t/oth/06/35/T06350000200515PDFE.pdf

#### Starting Point: Howard & Longstaff



This 7-part taxonomy appears in "A Common Language for Computer Security Incidents" from 1998, by John Howard & Tom Longstaff, published by Sandia National Labs.

#### **One Implementation: The IODEF**



5 of the 7 parts from Howard & Longstaff's taxonomy were adopted as data element classes in the IETF's Incident Object Definition Exchange Format, an XML schema for cyber incident reporting.

## Security Information Interoperability

- Standardized Language
  - Structured Threat Information Expression
- Standardized Exchange Mechanism
  - Trusted Automated
     Exchange of Indicator Information
- Make it easier to express, exchange, consume, and correlate cyber threat intelligence

S

- Large group of contributing parties
- Used by real products/communities
- Supported by an active community and running code

http://secure360.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Threat-Intelligence-Sharing-using-STIX-and-TAXII.pdf

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#### Thank You

